Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 065708

62
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/ARN:MDRAPER:MAR
APPROVED BY NEA:ALATHERTONJR.
DOD/DSAA - LT GEN FISH
DOD/OSD/ISA:MAJ. GEN. BALDWIN
PM:TSTERN
S/S-O:MTANNER
---------- 058864
O R 180306Z MAR 76
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
INFO USCINCEUR

S E C R E T STATE 065708

EXDIS, FOR AMBASSADORS PORTER AND PICKERING FROM ATHERTON

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MASS, PFOR, SA, JO, US, XF

SUBJECT: JORDAN'S AIR DEFENSE PROBLEM

REFS: (A) AMMAN 1223; (B) AMMAN 1225; (C) JIDDA 1697;
(C) JIDDA 1797; (E) STATE 54657

1. THIS MESSAGE OUTLINES A STRATEGY FOR DEALING WITH THE SAUDIS AND JORDANIANS TO SECURE A COMPROMISE AIR DEFENSE ARRANGEMENT WHICH WOULD SATISFY A MAXIMUM OF JORDAN'S MILITARY REQUIREMENTS WHILE GETTING COSTS DOWN TO A LEVEL WHICH, ALTHOUGH HIGHER THAN DOLS 300 MILLION, THE SAUDIS MIGHT CONSIDER FINANCING.

2. WE HAVE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT VIEWS IN REFTELS AS WELL AS TENOR OF TECHNICAL QUESTIONS DIRECTED TO US BY CINC BIN SHAKIR AND RJAF COMMANDER ABBOUD AT LAST WEEK'S U.S.-
SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 065708

JORDANIAN JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION MEETINGS. BOTH GENERALS GAVE IMPRESSION THAT 14 HAWK BATTERIES AND 100 VULCANS CONSTITUTE VIRTUALLY SACRED FIGURES FOR HUSSEIN. NEVERTHELESS, ABBOUD IN PARTICULAR IS CLEARLY SEEKING WAYS IN WHICH OTHER

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006

ELEMENTS OF THE TOTAL PACKAGE (PARTICULARLY THOSE NOT STRICTLY ESSENTIAL TO MAINTAIN OR OTHERWISE SUPPORT THE BASIC HAWK/VULCAN SYSTEM INITIALLY) CAN BE ELIMINATED OR DEFERRED IN ORDER TO SAVE MONEY. ALSO, THE TWO MEN HAVE

INDICATED THAT JORDANIANS ARE CONSIDERING SPECIAL FUND-RAISING MEASURES -- ADDITIONAL TAXES, FOR EXAMPLE.

3. WE MEANWHILE HAVE BEEN REVIEWING WHETHER U.S. COULD MAKE USE OF MAP GRANT OR FMS CREDIT, POSSIBLY EMPLOYING SAUDI OR OTHER EXTERNAL GUARANTEES OF CREDIT AS SUGGESTED BY AMBASSADOR PICKERING. WE ARE, HOWEVER, ON RECORD WITH THE CONGRESS THAT THE HAWK SALE WOULD BE AN FMS TRANS-ACTION WITH NO RPT NO U.S. FINANCIAL PARTICIPATION. TO CHANGE THAT POSITION, EVEN SLIGHTLY, WOULD INCUR THE RISK OF RE-OPENING THE WHOLE SALE TRANSACTION TO PUBLIC DEBATE AT AN UNINVITING TIME.

4. THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE POSITION WE WILL WANT TO PROJECT TO THE JORDANIANS AND SAUDIS ARE:

-- (A) JORDANIAN ACQUISITION OF THE TOTAL AIR DEFENSE SYS-TEM AS ORIGINALLY CONCEIVED WILL HAVE TO BE BROKEN DOWN INTO TWO STAGES, WITH THE SECOND STAGE TO BE NEGOTIATED AND CARRIED OUT AFTER SUPPLEMENTARY FINANCING HAS BEEN WORKED OUT SATISFACTORILY, USING WHATEVER MIX OF INTERNAL JORDANIAN RESOURCES AND EXTERNAL FINANCING FROM SAUDI AND OTHER POTENTIAL DONORS MAY BE DEVELOPED.

-- (B) IN ACCORD WITH OUR COMMITMENT TO CONGRESS, WE WOULD NOT INVOLVE OURSELVES FINANCIALLY IN THE FIRST STAGE, BUT WILL CONSIDER -- IN CONSULTATION WITH CONGRESS-- USING GUARANTEED FMS CREDIT ARRANGEMENTS IN THE SECOND STAGE. JORDAN AND SAUDI ARABIA WILL HAVE TO FINANCE FIRST STAGE.

-- (C) THE FIRST-STAGE PACKAGE WOULD OMIT CERTAIN BASIC
SECRET

COMMAND AND CONTROL EQUIPMENT; CERTAIN LOGISTICAL SUPPORT ITEMS AND FACILITIES; DESIRABLE BUT MARGINAL DEPOT, MAIN-TENANCE AND FIRING-RANGE ARRANGEMENTS IN JORDAN; ALL BUT BARE-BONES TRAINING; AND ALL BUT MINIMUM SPARE PARTS REQUIRED FOR INITIAL OPERATIONS IN JORDAN.

-- (D) THE FIRST STAGE, HOWEVER, WOULD HAVE TO MAKE MILI-TARY SENSE AND PROVIDE AN AUSTERE DEFENSE FOR AT LEAST TWO AND PREFERABLY MORE OF THE FOUR PRIORITY AREAS WHICH JORDANIANS HAVE INDICATED THEY WISH TO PROTECT.

-- (E) IN ADDITION TO ELIMINATING LOWER-PRIORITY ITEMS AS IN (C) ABOVE, USG WOULD DO ITS BEST TO PARE DOWN TERMINA-

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006

TION AND/OR CONTRACT INTERRUPTION COSTS ALREADY DEVELOPED.

-- (F) PAYMENT FOR A FIRST-STAGE PACKAGE WOULD, AS ORIGINALLY PROVIDED FOR IN THE TOTAL SYSTEM ENVISAGED BY

THE JORDANIANS, BE SPACED OUT THROUGH MID-1978 FOR HARD-WARE AND PROBABLY LONGER FOR SOFTWARE COSTS, INCLUDING TRAINING, CONTRACTOR SERVICES, ETC.

-- (G) BOTH JORDAN AND SAUDI ARABIA WOULD BE CAUTIONED THAT THE ADDED COSTS FOR THE SECOND-STAGE PACKAGE CAUSED BY THE STRETCH-OUT WILL INEVITABLY RISE AS TIME PASSES AND THAT CONSEQUENTLY THE TOTAL COSTS OF THE COMPLETE SYSTEM DESIRED BY JORDAN WILL GO BEYOND THE APPROXIMATELY DOLS 713 MILLION ROUGH-ORDER-OF-MAGNITUDE FIGURE PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED.

5. FOR AMBASSADOR PORTER: YOU SHOULD MAKE NO APPROACH TO SAUDIS UNTIL WE HAVE AMBASSADOR PICKERING'S JUDGMENT ON THE TACTICAL QUESTION OF WHETHER WE MAKE FIRST APPROACH TO SAUDIS OR HUSSEIN. IF AND WHEN WE AUTHORIZE AN APPROACH TO SAUDIS, OUR THINKING IS THAT YOU SHOULD GO TO PRINCE FAHD TO DESCRIBE THE SITUATION AS WE NOW SEE IT AND OUR PROPOSED SOLUTIONS. DRAWING ON BASIC ELEMENTS OF OUR POSITION OUTLINED ABOVE, YOUR AIM SHOULD BE TWO-FOLD: (A) TO OBTAIN SAUDI AGREEMENT TO A TWO-STAGE CONCEPT, WITH THE SAUDIS FUNDING A FIRST-STAGE PACKAGE GREATER THAN DOLS 300 MILLION, PREFERABLY IN THE DOLS 500 MILLION RANGE; (B) TO

SECRET

OBTAIN SAUDI COMMITMENT TO A COMMON U.S.-SAUDI POSITION WHICH WE COULD PRESENT TO HUSSEIN ON HIS VISIT TO WASHING-TON MARCH 30-31 AS A COMPROMISE OPTION THAT WOULD SATISFY MANY IF NOT MOST OF HIS NEEDS IN THE FIRST STAGE. (WITH FIRM SAUDI BACKING, OUR CHANCES OF PERSUADING HUSSEIN TO ACCEPT A REASONABLE COMPROMISE AND TO IGNORE THE SOVIET ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE GREATLY ENHANCED.)

6. YOU MAY WISH TO ADJUST YOUR PRESENTATION TO ACCORD TO WHAT YOU JUDGE WILL BE MOST EFFECTIVE, BUT OUR VIEW IS THAT YOU SHOULD FIRST EXPLAIN THAT HUSSEIN HAS ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO A FORCE OF 14 HAWK BATTERIES, AND IT IS QUESTIONABLE WHETHER HE WOULD ACCEPT ANY SMALLER FORCE. WE HAVE, HOWEVER, EXAMINED SMALLER OPTIONS FOR ILLUSTRA-TIVE PURPOSES. WE ARE PARTICULARLY CONVINCED THAT HE COULD NOT ACCEPT WHAT COULD BE PURCHASED FOR DOLS 300 MILLION. THIS WOULD PAY FOR ONLY SIX HAWK BATTERIES/36 VULCANS, (COSTING A BARE-BONES MINIMUM OF DOLS 271.5 MIL-LION). AT BEST IT WOULD PROVIDE AUSTERE PROTECTION FOR THE AMMAN-ZARQA AREA ONLY, ONE OF HIS FOUR PRIORITY AREAS TO PROTECT.

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006

7. AT THIS POINT YOU MIGHT THEN DESCRIBE THE TWO-STAGE CONCEPT (PARA 4) AND THE ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS WE HAVE DEVELOPED, IN WHICH WE PARED TO THE BONE ALL MARGINAL AND LESS ESSENTIAL SOFTWARE (FIGURES IN PARENTHESES INCORPORATE A 15 PERCENT CONTINGENCY FIGURE FOR POSSIBLE INFLATION AND OTHER UNFORESEEN NEEDS):

OPTION	MIX	DOL(MILLIONS) (ESTIMATED)
1	14 HAWK BATT/100 VULCANS	520.5 (598.6)
2	14 HAWK BATT/36 VULCANS	456.5 (525)
3	14 HAWK BATT/NO VULCANS	420.5 (483.6)
4	9 HAWK BATT/36 VULCANS	348.5 (400.8)
5	8 HAWK BATT/36 VULCANS	329.5 (378.9)
6	6 HAWK BATT/36 VULCANS	271.5 (312.2)

8. THE FOUR AREAS JORDAN WANTS TO PROTECT ARE:

(A) AMMAN-ZARQA, MAJOR POPULATION, STRATEGIC INDUSTRIAL, MILITARY COMPLEX

SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 065708

(B) AZRAQ. FIGHTER BASE, LONG-RANGE RADAR, AND PLANNED CENTRAL COMMAND-CONTROL FACILITY.

(C) PRINCE HASSAN AFB (FIGHTER BASE)

(D) QATRANA. LONG-RANGE RADAR.

9. PROS AND CONS IN LIGHT OF POL/MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS:

OPTION 1 -- SATISFIES HUSSEIN'S ATTACHMENT TO 14/100 FIGURE COMBINATION AND COVERS THE FOUR PRIORITY AREAS. ALL OTHER OPTIONS FALL SHORT OF WHAT HUSSEIN REGARDS AS MINIMUM AIR DEFENSE.

OPTION 2 -- THE FEWER VULCANS UNDERMINE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF HAWKS. (SEE OPTION 3 BELOW.)

OPTION 3 -- ALTHOUGH THE 14 HAWK BATTERIES MAY SOUND GOOD AND HELP HUSSEIN'S DOMESTIC NEEDS, THE CONCEPT OF DEPLOYING THEM ALONE IS MILITARILY UNSOUND. THE VULCANS ARE NEEDED TO CHANNEL HOSTILE AIRCRAFT INTO "ENVELOPES" OFFERING MAXIMUM FIRING ADVANTAGES TO HAWKS. SINCE HAWKS WILL BE IN HARDENED, NON-MOBILE SITES, IT IS ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT TO HAVE THE MOBILITY OFFERED BY VULCAN GUNS SO AS TO ADJUST TO TACTICAL SITUATIONS. BIN SHAKIR AND ABBOUD TELL US JORDAN DOES NOT HAVE ANTI-AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT TO SUBSTITUTE FOR VULCANS.

OPTION 4 -- CONSTITUTES A REASONABLY GOOD MIX OF HAWKS AND VULCANS, ALLOWING SIX BATTERIES TO DEFEND THE AMMAN-ZARQA COMPLEX, WITH THREE OTHER BATTERIES DEPLOYED AT

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006

AZRAQ. (ALTERNATIVELY, THREE BATTERIES COULD BE USED TO DEFEND AZRAQ, WITH THREE AT QATRANA TO PROTECT LONG-RANGE RADAR THERE, AND THREE BATTERIES COULD PROTECT OTHER MAJOR FIGHTER BASE AT PRINCE HASSAN AFB). IN ANY ARRANGEMENT, HOWEVER, ONE OF THE FOUR TARGET AREAS WOULD BE LEFT UNPROTECTED; HOWEVER, THE AZRAQ AND QATRANA INSTALLATIONS WILL NOT BE COMPLETED FOR AT LEAST TWO MORE YEARS AND ONE AREA COULD BE LEFT FOR THE SECOND STAGE. A MAJOR PROBLEM WITH THIS AND FOLLOWING OPTIONS IS THAT THEY DO NOT MEET HUSSEIN'S EXPRESSED DESIRE FOR 14 HAWK BATTERIES.
SECRET

OPTION 5 - USING A DEPLOYMENT PATTERN SIMILAR TO THE ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENT IN OPTION 4, TWO BATTERIES COULD BE USED AS A MINIMUM DEFENSE OF PRINCE HASSAN AIR FORCE BASE SINCE JORDAN'S CENTRAL COMMAND AND CONTROL FACILITY WOULD NOT BE LOCATED THERE.

OPTION 6 - AS NOTED PARA 6 ABOVE, THIS WOULD UNQUESTIONABLY BE UNACCEPTABLE TO HUSSEIN. IT COULD, HOWEVER, PROTECT EITHER THE MAJOR POPULATION AND STRATEGIC AREA OF AMMAN/ZARQA, OR, ALTERNATIVELY, TWO OF THE OTHER PRIORITY AREAS MENTIONED ABOVE.

10. FYI: 36 VULCAN FIGURE IS ACTUALLY SOMEWHAT ARBITRARY, ALTHOUGH FAIRLY SOUND MILITARILY, FOR THE SMALLER OPTIONS 4-5-6. 36 ARE IN STOCK; ADDITIONAL VULCANS WOULD HAVE TO COME FROM FUTURE PRODUCTION. END FYI.

11. FYI: OPTION 4 (FOR 9 BATTERIES/36 VULCANS) IS PROBABLY THE MINIMUM WE COULD REALISTICALLY EXPECT HUSSEIN TO ACCEPT AS FIRST STAGE OF A TWO-STAGE APPROACH, THOUGH AGAIN WE RECOGNIZE THAT ANYTHING LESS THAN 14 BATTERIES WILL GIVE HIM TROUBLE. IT FOLLOWS THAT YOU SHOULD MAKE YOUR PRESENTATION IN SUCH A WAY THAT THE SAUDIS WILL SEE FOR THEMSELVES THAT OPTION 4 CLEARLY IS THE ABSOLUTE MINIMUM, NEEDING AN ADDITIONAL DOLS 100 MILLION TO COVER UNFORESEEN CONTINGENCIES AND THAT EVEN THIS FALLS BELOW WHAT HUSSEIN HAS SO FAR INSISTED ON.
FOR AMBASSADOR PICKERING:
12. IN EXAMINING WHETHER WE SHOULD GO FIRST TO THE SAUDIS OR TO HUSSEIN WE NEED TO WEIGH FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS:

A. THE JORDANIANS HAVE ASKED US TO INTERCEDE WITH THE SAUDIS, AND AMBASSADOR PORTER HAS ALREADY HAD TWO CONVERSATIONS IN WHICH SAUDIS INDICATED THEY WOULD BE INTERESTED IN ANY ALTERNATIVES WE COULD SUGGEST TO THE DOLS 713 MILLION PACKAGE. THEY ARE MEANWHILE HOLDING OFF GOING TO THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS FOR A DECISION WHICH, AT THIS STAGE, WOULD LOCK TEM INTO A DOLS 300 MILLION CEILING. AMB PORTER'S APPROACH WOULD BE DESIGNED TO SHOW THE SAUDIS HOW LITTLE HUSSEIN WOULD GET FOR DOLS 300 MILLION AND TO

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006

MAKE CLEAR THAT THIS WOULD BE A NON-STARTER, GIVEN HUSSEIN-
COMMITMENT TO A COMPREHENSIVE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM. HE WOULD

IN THE FIRST INSTANCE TRY TO PERSUADE THE SAUDIS TO
FINANCE A FULL BUT AUSTERE 14 HAWK BATTERY/100 VULCAN
SYSTEM, WHICH WOULD REDUCE THE TOTAL PRICE TO DOLS 520-
598 MILLION. HE WOULD AT THE SAME TIME DESCRIBE ALTER-
NATIVE PACKAGES AT LOWER COSTS, WHILE POINTING OUT THEIR
DRAWBACKS FROM A MILITARY POINT OF VIEW. THE ARGUMENT
FOR GOING FIRST TO THE SAUDIS IS THAT, IF WE COULD AGREE
ON A U.S.-SAUDI COMMON POSITION FOR A COMPROMISE SOLU-
TION, SATISFYING AS MANY OF HUSSEIN'S CONCERNS AS POSSIBLE,
THIS COULD THEN BE PRESENTED TO HUSSEIN ON HIS U.S. VISIT
AS THE RESULT OF OUR EFFORTS WITH THE SAUDIS WHICH WOULD
BE MORE DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO REJECT THAN IF WE WENT TO
HIM IN THE FIRST INSTANCE.

B. IF WE WERE TO GO FIRST TO HUSSEIN WITHOUT A FIRM
SAUDI COMMITMENT TO A PACKAGE WHICH, WHILE LESS THAN THE
FULL DOLS 713 MILLION, WE COULD PRESENT TO HUSSEIN AS
REASONABLY RESPONSIVE TO HIS ESSENTIAL NEEDS, THERE IS A
HIGH RISK THAT HE WOULD SIMPLY INSIST ON THE FULL DOLS 713
MILLION PACKAGE. IF WE CAN GET THE SAUDIS TO AGREE TO
GO ABOVE THE DOLS 300 MILLION CEILING, WHICH UP TO NOW
THEY HAVE SAID IS THEIR MAXIMUM, WE COULD PRESENT THIS
TO HUSSEIN AS A POSITIVE ACCOMPLISHMENT BY US IN RESPONSE
TO HIS REQUEST THAT WE INTERCEDE WITH THE SAUDIS. IN THE
FINAL ANALYSIS, HUSSEIN RETAINS THE RIGHT TO TURN DOWN
ANY COMPROMISE, BUT WE THINK IT WOULD BE LESS LIKELY IF
PRESENTED TO HIM AS A JOINT U.S.-SAUDI POSITION. THE
PRINCIPAL RISK, HOWEVER, IN GOING FIRST TO THE SAUDIS IS
THAT, DESPITE OUR EFFORTS TO PUT THIS IN THE BEST LIGHT,
HUSSEIN WOULD REACT NEGATIVELY TO OUR NOT HAVING CON-
SULTED HIM FIRST. THIS PROBLEM WOULD BE COMPOUNDED IF
HUSSEIN HEARD FROM THE SAUDIS, AS IS POSSIBLE, THAT WE
WERE DISCUSSING SCALED-DOWN ALTERNATIVES WITH THEM.

13. BEARING IN MIND THE HIGH STAKES, PLEASE ADVISE ASAP
WHETHER YOU THINK WE COULD GET AWAY WITH GOING TO THE
SAUDIS FIRST OR WHETHER YOU THINK WE MUST INSTEAD START
WITH HUSSEIN AND OVERCOME HIS OPPOSITION TO OUR DISCUS-
SECRET

SING SCALED-DOWN PACKAGES WITH OTHERS.

14. IF IN YOUR JUDGMENT WE SHOULD APPROACH HUSSEIN
FIRST, PLEASE LET US HAVE YOUR THOUGHTS ON METHOD AND
TIMING OF APPROACH TO ELICIT MOST CONSTRUCTIVE REACTION

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006

FROM HIM. SHOULD WE DO THIS BEFORE OR DURING HUSSEIN'S
WASHINGTON VISIT? SHOULD WE SOLICIT HIS VIEWS, OR CAST
IT IN TERMS OF BRIEFING HIM ON STATUS OF OUR EFFORTS WITH
SAUDIS - E.G., TELLING HIM WE HAVE PREVAILED ON SAUDIS
TO HOLD OFF FORMALIZING DOLS 300 MILLION CEILING, ARE
TRYING TO GET THEM TO GO ABOVE THAT CEILING, ARE

DESCRIBING TO THEM ILLUSTRATIVELY THE KINDS OF PACKAGES
THAT FINANCING AT VARIOUS LEVELS BELOW DOLS 713 MILLION
WOULD BUY TOGETHER WITH THE MILITARY DRAWBACKS, AND
ARE EXAMINING CONCEPT OF A TWO-STAGE APPROACH AS POSSIBLE
WAY OF OVERCOMING SAUDI RESISTANCE?
KISSINGER

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 15 SEP 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: AIR DEFENSE, FINANCE, MILITARY ASSISTANCE, MISSILES
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 18 MAR 1976
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: ShawDG
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976STATE065708
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: NEA/ARN:MDRAPER:MAR
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: D760101-0991
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t197603116/baaaeojn.tel
Line Count: 340
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a <MCM 20040602 CORRECTION>; EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: ShawDG
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 14 OCT 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: WITHDRAWN <16 JUN 2004 by izenbei0, 3.4.X6>; RELEASED <14 OCT 2004 by KelleyW0>; APPROVED <04 NOV 2004 by ShawDG>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: <DBA CHANGED> MCM 20040602
Subject: JORDAN'S AIR DEFENSE PROBLEM
TAGS: MASS, PFOR, SA, JO, US, XF
To: JIDDA
AMMAN INFO USCINCEUR
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006